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MODELING THE OFFENSE DECISION: A CRITICAL SURVEY 
J. M. Heineke* 
Economic Models of Criminal Behavior: 
Implications and Shortcomings 
Over the past six to eight years, economists have shown 
increasing in terest in modeling the choice problem con front-
ing individuals engaged in illegal activities. A number of 
factors are responsible for this new found interest, not 
the least of which are the lack of progress on the part of 
criminologists in providing a systematic framewor k for 
analyzing criminal activity, and the belated recognition 
by economists [due primarily to Becker's (1 968) paper 1 
that the choice theoretic models of microeconomics afford 
a particularly useful structure for such an analysis. 
Criminologists have approached the task of explaining 
illegal activity by attempting to determine those psychologi-
cal and/or physiological fa ctors that are unique to criminals. 
This has led criminologists to study the backgrounds and 
behavior patterns of individual criminals in the hope of 
identifying a common set of characteristics which under-
pin criminal behavior. Such an essentially inductive approach 
to model building will not in general lead to testable models 
of criminal behavior. 
On the other hand, economic models of criminal behavior 
take as given those influences in the personal and social 
backgrounds of individuals that determine "respect for 
law," proclivities to violence, preferences for risk and other 
behavioral characteristics held to be determinants of crimi-
nality. These models are based upon characteristics of 
individuals which are alleged to be common not only to 
large classes of offenders, but to large classes of economic 
agents in general. In a sentence, the models of economic 
*This work was supported in part by grant no . 75 NI-99-0123 
from the Justice Department to the Hoover Institution at 
Stanford University. 
choice theory, of which the criminal choice is a special 
case, hypothesize that all individuals, criminal and non-
criminal al ike, respond to incentives; and if the costs and 
benefits associated with an action change , the agent's choices 
are also likely to change . More specifically, these models 
postulate that the decision to commit an illegal act is 
reached via an egocentric cost-benefit analysis. As is implicit 
in this statement , the expected benefits and costs associated 
with an illegal act may contain both monetary and psychic 
elements. But by treating the individual's "taste for crime" 
as a datum, one may build a theory of criminal behavior 
based upon the opportunities confronting the potential 
offender. 
In what follows we contrast the alternative model speci-
fications which have been adopted by economists to explain 
criminal behavior. Four classes of models are presented, 
which, to o ur knowledge, include all models in the economic 
li te rature as special cases) 
A Brief Survey of the Literature 
Perusual of the economic literature indicates two distinct 
modeling strategies. The papers of Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972), Kolm (1973), and Singh (1973) have treated the 
offense decision as essentially a portfolio decision.2 Such a 
task is permissable only in so far as all consequences of the 
illegal activity in question may be expressed in purely mone-
tary terms. Because each of these papers addresses the 
question of income tax evasion, there would seem to be 
little doubt that benefits from the illegal activity are purely 
1 We are referri ng here to theoretical models, not empirical models. 
2 1n this paper we use the terminology portfolio problem or portfolio 
decision to designate a decision problem wi th uncertain consequences 
in w hich a U "costs" and a ll "benefi ts" are pecuniary. 
Dr. Heineke (Ph.D., University of Iowa) is Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Santa Clara. His publications 
have appeared in the American Economic R eview, the Journal of Political Economy, the R eview of Economic Studies, the 
Review of Economics and Statistics, the Santa Clara Business Review, and other journals. 
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monetary in nature. But although the penalty for unsuccess-
ful evasion is almost inevitably a fine, it is doubtful whether 
the total cost of unsuccessful evasion is the fine, since the 
convic ted evader may experience significa nt non-moneta1y 
costs in the form of loss of respectability, reputation, etc. 
To the extent that this is the case, it will be inappropriate 
to employ the portfolio specification) In addition, to the 
extent that the illegal activity in quest ion is time consuming, 
it again will be inappropriate to model the decision prob lem 
as a choice over wealth orderings. The fact that an illegal 
activity is time consuming, means that the offense decision 
problem is formally a labor supply problem with uncertain 
consequences.4 And given the set of time consuming illegal 
activ ities, the more interesting questions, both from the 
point of view of economic theory and of social policy, 
would seem to be those concerned with the factors responsi-
ble for the individual's time allocation between legal and 
illegal activities and how responsive the individual is to 
changes in these factors. The po int is that, except for care-
fully selected illegal acts, any reali~tic model o f criminal 
behavior will be a time allocation model which in addition 
explicitly accounts for the psychic cos ts and benefits asso-
cia ted with criminal activity. 
A second group of papers addressing the criminal choice, 
the papers o f Becker (I 968), Block and Heineke (197Sa), 
Ehrlich ( 1970, 1973), and Sjoquist ( 1973), all view the 
criminal choice problem as a time a llocation problem and 
to one degree or another acknowledge the role of non-
monetary costs and returns in the offender's decision prob-
lem. But although each of these authors claims to recognize 
both the time allocative aspects of the problem and, the 
non-monetary aspects of the penalty if unsuccessful, the 
qualitative implications of these models differ substantially. 
The causes of such variation between models is of consider-
able interest both theoret ically and p ractical ly and are 
examined at some length in what follows. Briefly, the 
differences between models is a result of specialized assump-
tions (either explicit or implicit) concerning either the 
amount of time devoted to leisure or the role of non-
monetary (psychic) attribu tes, or both. We proceed by 
presenting a series of models into which an increasing 
number of characteristics of the criminal choice are incor-
porated. To my knowledge all currently published models 
appear as special cases of one of these models. Shortcomings 
of the various specifica tions and differences in implicat ions 
are noted at each step. We begin with a "portfolio" model 
of the criminal choice. 
3A1J ingham and Sandmo acknowledge this point an d devote a section 
of their paper to a model which incorporates non-monetary attributes 
o f unsuccessfu l tax evasion. 
4See Block and Heineke (1973) for an analysis of the labor supply 
decision when retu rns are stochastic. 
Model I - The Portfolio Model 
Consider an individua l with an exogenous income con-
fron ted with the problem of deciding what portion of this 
income to allocate to illegal activity (the risky asset). The 





wealth o r exogenous income 
the individual's von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
funct ion, Uw > 0, Uww < 0 
the proportion of W0 to be allocated to illegal 
activity, 0 ~ x ~ 1 
g (x, a): the increase in income if the illegal endeavor is 




the moneta1y penalty if the illegal endeavor is un-
successful; (3 is a shift parameter. 
the probabili ty that the illegal endeavor is unsuc-
cessful 
the individual's income if the illegal endeavor is 
successful; Ws = W0 + g (x, a) 
the individual's income if the illegal endeavor is un-
successful; W u = W0 + g (x, a) - f (x, (3) 
If apprehended the individual's income is reduced by the 
amount f (x, (3) ~ g (x, a). To carry out an analysis of the 
agent's decision it is necessary to adopt certain conventions 
concerning the fu nctions g 0 and((·). These are 
g 0 > 0, X> 0 ; g (-) = 0, X = 0 
f 0 > 0 , X> 0 ; f 0 = 0, X = 0 
gx > 0 ; ga > 0 ; gxa> 0 
fx> 0 ; f(3 > 0; fx(3> 0 
These conditions are obvious: Gains and losses from illegal 
activity (i) are non-negative; (ii) are increasing functions of 
the amount at risk; and (iii) are increasing functions of the 
shift parameters a and (3, for given values of x. Finally, 
increases in the shift parameters a and (3 are defined to in-
crease not only total gains and total losses, ga > 0, f(3 > 0, 
but also marginal losses, gxa > 0, fx(3 > 0. 
Adopting this framework, the agents' expected uti li ty is:S 
For the agent to devote some, but not all, of his income to 
il legal activity there must be an x0 such that 
It is straight forward to interpret these conditions when 
(2) holds as a strict inequali ty and either x0 = 0 or x0 = I. 
We leave th is to the interested reader and assume 0 <x0 < 1. 
S[n what fo llows we assume that all funct ions possess continuous 
derivatives of sufficient order to permit the analysis and that regu lar, 
internal maxima ex ist for each model. 
jiiP 
The questions of interest here are the responses of the 
equilibrium portion of income devoted to illegal activity, 
xo, to changes in the several parameters in the model. 





axo ~ - ( (1 - p) U" (Ws) gx + pU"(Wu)(gx- fx)) /11 o 
aWO 
ax
0 ~ - gxa (oEU/aw<') I J 1° + ga (ax0 /aWO) 
a a 
ax
0 ~ (p(~- fx) U"(Wu)f~+U'(Wu) fx~))/1 1 ° a~ 
axo ~ (U' (Ws) gx - U' (Wu) (gx - fx)) I J 10 
ap 
Finally define ax0 /a'Y to be a shi ft in the penalty function 
and a corresponding change in p such that the expected loss 
remains unchanged. That is, ax0 /a'Y= (ax0 /o~) I d (pf) ~ 0. 
Now d (pf) ~ p(fxdx + f~d~) + fdp = o, so that a(pf) I a~ = 






+ ax0 QQ._ 







1n equations (3) - (7) the symbol J 1° represents the Jacobian 
associated with equilibrium condition (2), evaluated at x0 , 
and is negative by hypothesis. Defining the Arrow-Pratt 
measure of absolu te risk aversion as R (W) = - U" /U' 
and keeping in mind that we have assumed the poten tial 
offender to be risk averse, we adopt the usual assumption 
that aRjaw < 0. It can be shown (see Appendix) that the 
model possesses the following qualitative properties: 
(3') axo > 0 
awn 
The individual invests a larger port ion of his income in 
illegal endeavors the wealthier he is. 
(4') axo > 0 
a a 
Increases in the returns to illegal activity, increase the in-
come allocation to these activities. 
(5') axo < 0 
a~ 
Increases in the costs of engaging in illegal activity cause de-
creases in allocation to these activities. 
(6') axo < 0 
ap 
Increases in the probability of "failure" cause decreases in 
the alloca lion to illegal activity. And finally, iff (x, ~) is 
Modeling the Offense Decision: A O·itical Survey - Heineke 
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separabie6 
(7') axo < 0 
O'Y 
Compensated increases in the penalty which leave expect ed 
losses unchanged, decrease the allocation to illegal activity. 
This is equivalent, by equation (7), to saying that propor-
tional increases in pun ishmen t (loss) deter illegal activity to 
a greater extent than do equi-proportional increases in the 
probability of apprehension. It can also be shown (see Block 
and Heineke [1975a]), that equation (7) is equivalent to 
measuring the allocative effect of a mean preserving change 
in the dispersion of returns. Since mean preserving increases 
in ~ increase the dispersion of returns to illegal endeavors, 
equation (7') may be in terpreted as implying that increases 
in the amount of uncertainly surround ing returns to illegal 
activity will decrease the income allocated to these activities. 
A number of points are of interest here: First, qualita tive 
results (5'), (6'), and (7') depend only upon risk aversion 
and the fact that the individual allocates some but not all 
of his income t o illegal activities, i.e., 0 < x0 < 1.7 Results 
(3') and ( 4') require in addition the hypothesis of decreasing 
absolute risk aversion. Second, inequalities (4') - (7') are 
the .formal underpinning of any unambiguous economic 
theory of deterrence. These inequalities tel l us that increases 
in gains always increase criminal activity, wliile increases in 
costs always decrease criminal activity. ln addition, either 
increases in the probability of failure or increases in the 
amoun t of uncertainty surrounding returns will assuredly 
decrease the resources being allocated to criminal activity. 
Third, although the return and loss functions of Model I are 
quite general, it must be kept in mind that these functions 
contain only monetary gains and losses and hence the model 
will be strictly applicable only when all returns and all costs 
from engaging in the illegal activity are monetary in nature. 
This implies there are no non-monetary aspects associated 
with the penalty if a failure occurs and also that the activity 
in question does not en ta il a significant " labor" input, which 
would introduce elements of a time allocation problem. 
One of the more realistic applications of this model 
would seem to be to the p roblem of optimal under reporting 
of income to the tax authorities. In this case the labor input 
tends to be insignificant and the psychic costs associated 
with conviction for tax fraud may, at least in some social 
groups, be relatively small. As we noted above this is the 
pro·blem treated in the Allingham and Sandmo, Kolm and 
Singh papers. Obviously, if we are to have a broadly applicable 
6Here we use "separable" in the sense that f (x, ~) = f 1 (x) f2 ({3). 
It does not seem to be possib le to establish (71) without restrict ing f 
(· ). Resu lts of this type reported in the literature are usua lly Ob· 
tained under t he strong assumption that f (x, ~) = ~x, Le., f 1 (x) = x 
and f2 (/3) = ~- If we define ry = f (x/f) as the elasticity of the penalt y 
w.r. t. changes in t he income alloc~tion, then ary'a(3= 0 is qualitatively 
equivalent to the condition f (x, ($) = f 1 (x) f2 (/3). In fact, as long as 
shifts 
1
in the penalty function do not result in decreases inTI, inequal· 
ity (7 ) wi ll hold. 
7 rn addition to r isk aversion, (71) requires t he penalty fu nction to 
be separab le in t he sense of f. n. 6. 
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theory, non-mone tary character istics of illegal activity must 
be accounted for.8 
Model II - Portfolio Models of Time Allocat ion 
The models presented in this section address in a particular 
manner, the question of the determinants of the allocation 
of time between legal and illegal activity. As we noted at the 
ou tset, the term "portfolio model" is used in this paper to 
denote that class of models in wh.ich all returns and costs are 
monetary. So "a port fo lio model of time allocation" is a 
non sequitor to the extent that "work," be it legal or illegal, 
is disagreeable, i.e., involves psychic costs. Tllis fact helps 
explain why authors who have uti li zed models of this sort 
(See Becker (1968), Ehrlich (1970, 1973) and Sjoquist 
(1973)), have just ified their approach by including in the 
ga in and loss funct ions of their models both moneta ry 
returns and the " monetaty or wealth equivalent" of any 
psychic gains or losses. Tl is shown below that implicit in the 
models o f these au thors a re rathe r strong restrictions on the 
functional form of the monetary equivalen ts o f effor t and 
penalties and hence on the preferences of offenders. We next 
digress to explore the formal structure of monetary equiva-
lents and establish the precise nature of these restrictions. 
A generalized version of thl' Becker-Elu·lich-Sjoquis t models 
is then presented. 
A Digression on Monetary Equivalence 
Two points are of in terest here: (I) Questions concerning 
the existence of monetaty equivalents of the psych.ic costs 
of the " labor" and penally att ributes of an offense; and 
(2) questions concerning the form of "total" (monetary plus 
psycllic) return and "total" cos t functions, assuming the 
appropriate monetary equivalents exist. 
8Jf the agent prefe rs r isk a nd the symmetric hypot hesis of increasing 
risk pre rerence is adopted, - aRtaw > 0 , it can be shown (see 
Appe ndix) tha t 
(3") axo > 0 
aw0 
as before; and tha t 
{7") axo > 0 
a'Y 
{4") (6" ) 
whe never the pe nalt y function is separable. In fact, u nder the con-
ditions of model I, ax0 t(Jy>o i[fU" > o and Vx0 tirt<o iffU"< 0. 
It is interesting_ to observe that whether the agent is risk averse or 
r isk preferring, increases in wealth resu lt in an increased portion of 
that wealth being devoted to illega l activity. Increased payoffs also 
resu lt in increased alloca tions to illega l endeavors independent o f the 
age nt's behavior toward risk. I n addit ion, increases in the probability 
of fa ilure results in decreased illega l a ll ocat io ns independen t of risk 
be havior. The only r esu lt which does not carry over f rom the r isk 
avers ion case is the response o f x0 t o changes in the penalt y, ax0 f(){3. 
The reason is obvious: Posit ive shifts in the pena lt y function decrease 
mean re turns and increase the dispersio n of returns; o n the o n t ha nd 
making the agent worse off, and on the other hand better off. It is 
not possible to determine the net effect. 
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The first question has been discussed in some detail in 
Block and Heineke (1975a) and in Block and Lind ( 1975). 
For our purposes here it will suffice to merely sketch the 
monetary equivalent argument in enough de tail to ind icate 
that it is not generally true that monetaty equivalents exist 
to labor and penalty attributes of an offen se. 
To begin, it should be no ted tha t there is agreement in the 
li terature that models o f the offense decision must in 
general accoun t for non-monetary costs in both the t ime 
allocation and penalty aspects of the decision. In other 
words, there is agreemen t that the underlying von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility fu nction is of the form Z (t 1, t2 , S, W), 
where t 1 and t2 represent the time allocated to legal and 
illegal activity, respectively, and S represents a vector of 
attributes of the penalty (the length of sen tence, loss of 
repu ta lion, etc.). 
To proceed, consider an individual with income W, who 
allocateJ t 1 " hours" to legal activity, t2 "hours" to illegal 
activity and suffe rs penal ty S. For the individual inquest ion, 
a monetary equivalent to this effort allocation and penalty 
exists if and on ly if there exists an inc0111e level sufficiently 
low, say W*, so that the individual is indifferent between 
tllis income with no penalty and no "work" and the given 
effort alloca tion, in come and penalty. Formally, if there 
exists a wealth level, W*, such that 
(8) Z (t 1, t2, S, W) = Z (0, 0, 0, W*) 
then W - W* is the moneta ry equivalent of t 1 "hours" of 
legal activity, t2 "hours" of illegal act ivity, and a penalty of 
severi ty S. Clearly, existence of such an equivalence will 
depend upon the tastes and preferences of the particular 
offender and there is no reason to expect il to exist in 
general. If, for example, for a part icular effort alloca tion and 
penally the marginal rate of substitution between income 
and either t 1, or t2 or S is infinite, t hen no monetary 
equivalent exists at that poinl. Or one cou ld ask whether for 
any given effort allocation there exists a reduction in income 
A 
to say W such that the agen t is indifferent between (t1, t2, A 
0, W) and (t 1, t2 , S, W). Of course this depends upon the 
given effort allocation, the severity of the penalty and the 
agen t's income. If the penalty is sufficiently severe and the 
discounted value of the agent's lifetime income is sufficiently 
low, a monetary equivalent to the penalty will not exist. 
Tf W represents discounted lifetime earnings, then no mean-
fu l mone tary equivalen t to the penalty Sexists whenever W 
- ~ > W. As the discussion and examples indicate, m one-
tary equivalents to psychic costs may no t exist. 
From equality (8) , if an income level W* exists such that 
Z (t1, t2, S, W) = Z (0, 0, 0 , W*) then W- W* is the mone-
ta ry equivalent of the "state of the world" (t1, t2 , S, W) 
and is a function of t1, t2, Sand W. Designating this func-
tion as C (-), we may write W* = W - C (t 1, t2, S, W). 
Defining Z (0, 0, 0, W*) = V (W*), we have V (W*) = V 
(W - C (t 1, t2, S, W)) which is the formaljustification for 
collapsing all argumen ts of the multiattribute utility func-
tion Z (-) in one atttibute. To sununarize, the monetary 
equivalen t approach to modeling the offen se decision implies 
that "return" and "cost" functions into which both mone-
tary and non-monetary returns have been aggregated (via 
monetary equivalen ts) will be funct ions of t 1, t2 , Sand W. 
That is, the function W - W* = C 0 is in general a function 
of each argumen t ente ring the uti lity function Z (·). 
To draw o u t the implications of this discussion for 
modeling the criminal choice we defme the following func-
tions: 
G (t2 , a): the monetary return resulting from t2 "hours" 
of illegal ac tivity; G2 > 0, Ga > 0 and G2a > O. 
F (t2, ~): t he monetary penalty resulting from t2 " ho urs" 
of illegal activity, if the individual is appre-
hended and convicted; F2 > 0, F~ > 0 and F2~ 
> O. 
L (t 1, o): the monetary return resulting from t 1 " hours" of 
legal activity; L1 > 0, L0> 0 and L15> 0. 
w · u· 
where the symbols a,~ and o represent shift parameters in 
the respective functions.9 It is also helpful to "disaggregate" 
C (t1, t2, S, W) into the functions c 1 (t I , t2 , S, W), C2 
(t 1, t2, S, W) and C3 (t1, t2, S, W), the monetary equivalents 
of the psychic costs of legal activity, illegal activity and th e 
penalty, respectively; and to defme [ (t1, t2 , S, W) = 
L (t 1, o) - c1 ( ·), G (t 1, t2 , S, W) = G (t2 , a) - C2 (·)and 
F (t 1, t2, S, W) = F (t2 , m + c3 0 as the "total" return 
functions for legal and illegal activity and the " total" cost 
of the penalty, respe.ctively. These are "total" return and cost 
fun ctions in the sense that the monetary equivalents of the 
psychic costs of "labor" have been netted out of L (-)and 
G 0 and the monetary equivalent of psychic costs of the 
penalty has been added to the monetary penalty, F (·). 
Once this has been accomplished the problem 
is equivalent to the problem I 0 
9
We sho uld ind ica te here that the . "failur e state," W , m ight be 
characterized eith er as {w0 + L + G - F; p~ or as { w 0 u+ L- F; p }, 
depending upon the d isposition o f G w hen /he individ ua l is captured. 
A more general fa ilure state ca n be obtained by defining t he random 
variable Y, 0 <Y <Q, with distribu tion funct ion K (y), to be the 
portion of G the offender manages to retain if cap tured. Then W 
becomes {w0 + L + YG- F; p} , which reduces to t he above speci~ 
cases when y = 1 a nd when y =o. See Heineke ( 197 5} for more 
detail. 
10Sce Blo ck and Hcin eke (1 97 4, l 975a) for more detaiL 
55 
Modeling the Offense Decision: A O'itical Survey - Heineke 
Portfolio Models of Time Allocation - Continued 
In this section two models are analyzed. Both are special 
cases of the model given as (10) above and are essentia lly 
generalized versions of the models presented by Becker, 
Elu-lich and Sjoquist. The firs t case o f in terest occurs when 
the monetary equivalent o f legal activity is restti cted to 
depend only upon t 1 and the monetary equivalents of illegal 
activity and the penalty are restricted to depend only 
upon t2. Formally, this means that. the functions C l, C2, 
and c3 above reduce to C I (t 1 ), C2 (t2) and c3 (t2) and 
hen ce "total" retu rn and "total" cos t func tions are I (t 1 o), 
G (t2 , a) and F (t2, ~).11 This wi ll be the case when, for 
example, the monetary equivalent of 12 " hours" of illegal 
activity is independent of (i) the amount of time the agent 
spends in legal activity, (ii) the at tributes of the penalty, S, 
and (iii) the wealth position or the agent. 
Under these conditions the problem is to maximize 
(1 - p) V (Ws) + pV (Wu) with respect to t 1 and t2 , subject 
to the constraint t 1 + t2 ~ t:' l 2 Necessary conditions foran 
internal maximum are 
(1 1) 
(1 - p) v' (Ws) I,+ pV' (Wu) [ 1 = 0 
(1 - p) v' (Ws) c2 + pV' (Wu) (G2 - F2) = 0 
The fi rst equation in (I I) provides a hint as to the conse-
quences o f the specialized monetary equivalents. In particula r, 
notice that this equa lion holds iff 1:1 = 0. Therefore the 
individual's time allocation to lega l activities will be inde-
pendent of his wealth, his time allocation to illegal endeavors 
and of all attribu tes of the penalty. lt is a lso clear from 
this equation that the uncertainty surrounding retu rns to 
il legal activi ties has absolu tely no effect on the time allocated 
to legal endeavors. So no matter what the agen t's wealth 
may be, no matter how high are returns to illegal endeavors, 
how low is the penalty or how un li kely is apprehension , 
model 11 always yields the same allocation of time to legal 
activity. Since these properties of model II are ofa globa l 
nature in that, as longas 0 < t 1o <t, t1o remains unchanged 
whatever the level of p, wo, G 0 and F (.),i t fo llows that 
the analogous marginal effects are zero. These results plus 
othe r comparative static proper ties of the model are p re-
sen ted next. The symbol 1Jf I is used to represent the 
Jacobian associated with system (11) evaluated at (tf, t~), 
the equilibrium allocation. The e lements of J~ are denoted 
Dij• i,j = 1, 2. 
0 (1 2) at1/ap = o 
il More precisely, ~(tl , o) = L (t , , 0)- c l ( tl), G ( t2, a) -
G ( t2 , a) - c2 (t 2), F (t2, (3) = F (t2, (3)- c3 (t2 ). 
12And of cou rse ti ~ 0, i = 1, 2. 
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( 12") 
Changes in the probability of apprehension have no effect 
on the time allocated to legal activity, while increases in this 
parameter will deter participation in illegal activities. 
(1 3) at?/aWO = o 
0 0 - 0 ( I7) oti/38 = - o22 (3EV/3W ) L 18 /IJ2 1 
(I 7') at7ta8 > o 
(13') at~/aWO = -D1 1 ((1-p)V"(Ws)G2+pV"(Wu)(G2-F2 ))/ IJ~ I 
( t3") at~taw0 > o 
(I 8) a t~/38 = I 8 (ot2foW0 ) 
(I8') a t~/a8 >o15 
Whether the individual is risk averse, risk neutral or prefers 
risk, exogenous changes in wealth will have no effect on the 
time allocated to legal activities. On the other hand, if the 
individual is risk averse and displays decreasing a bsolute risk 
aversion or prefers risk and displays increasing absolute risk 
preference, (- 3R/3W > 0), participation rates in illegal 
activ ities will increase with wea lth levels. 
(14) at~ taa = o 
(14') at2/aa= - D 11(?EV/3WO)G2a!IJ2 1 + c2 (at~/aWO) 
(14") at2 /oa > o 
Changes in the re turns to illegal endeavors have no effect on 
labor force participation rates, although decreasing absolute 
risk aversion implies the participation rate in illegal endeavors 
wi ll increase with increases in re turns. 
(15') ot2/o(J=pD II (V'(W u)F2(1+ F11v" (W u)(G2-F 2))fiJ21 
(15") at2/of1 < o 
Increasing the severi ty of the penalty for unsuccessful illegal 
acts will not affect the t 1 decision, but will deter criminal 
activity . It should be kept in mind here, that the penalty 
function F (t2, (1) measures only the level of monetary costs 
that depend upon t2 a lone . All other attributes of the 
punishment, S, are trea ted as parameters in F (-). 
(16) at~/o'Y= o 
I 0 0 0 - 13 (1 6) at2/a'Y = at2/af1 - at2/ap(pF 11/F) 
(t 6") at2/o'Y ~ o iff u" (W) ~ oi4 
Mean preserving increases in the dispersion of returns to 
illegal activity will have no effect on the ti decision. But 
if the pe na lty function is separable, such changes decrease, 
leave unc_hanged or increase participation in illegit im a te 
activities if and only if the agent is risk averse, risk ne u-
tral or prefers risk, respectively. 
13see eq uat ion (7) above. 
l 4This fo Uows ifF(·) is separable in the sense of footno te 6 above. 
Finally, increases in the returns to legal activity increase 
participation rates in both legal and illegal activity. Legal and 
illegal activities are gross complements! 
To be sure we are not accustomed to finding so many 
unambiguous quali ta tive results in the models of economic 
cho ice theory . TI1ese results stem from the independence of 
the markets for legal and illegal activities which is implied 
by the special nature of the monetary equivalences we have 
used. Of course system (II) is not a system of simultaneous 
equations, but rather a recursive system in which legal 
activity decisions are made and then, given t~, the allocation 
to illegal activities is determined. Comparison o f (12'), ( 13'), 
(14'), (I 5') and (16') with inequalities (3)- (7) above indi-
cates that this specification o f monetary equivalence func-
tions has had the effect of reducing the time alloca tion 
model given as (10) (or (9)), to a simple portfolio model. 
56 
The question remains as to whether or not it is permissible 
to restrict the preferences of offenders to such an extent. 
Only testing the model can provide the answer. And unlike 
most of the models of economic theory, the large number of 
unambiguous predictions yielded by model 11 afford an 
excellent opportunity for empirical t esting. TI1is is particular-
ly true due to the rather unorthodox predictions that the 
time spent in legal opportunities is independent o f the struc-
ture of returns to illegal activity and that legal and illegal 
activity are gross complements. These results alone provide 
a strong basis for testing the model. 
It is of interest to note that ifL1 < 0 then t f = 0 and again (as with the " internal" solution) is invariant to changes in 
returns and costs in the market for illegal activity. Clearly, 
the same conclusion follows ifL1 > 0. Tn this case t~ + t2 = 
fand no time is allocated to leisure. Moreover, as long as the 
second equation in (11) holds, all of the individual's time is 
alloca ted to legal endeavors, i.e., t~ = [ 16 
We stated above that the model we have just analyzed is a 
general version of the Becker, Ehrlich and Sjoquist models)? 
l ST he proofs of these propositions are entirely ana logous to those 
presented for model I once o ne no tes that L 1 = 0 implies D 12 = D2 1 
= 0. 
16Although OEV/Ot 1 > 0 implies t ~ = 0, if the second expression 
in (12) is s tric tly positive, o ther solulto ns fort 1 a nd t 2 are possible. 
l 7 Jn Ehrlich (1973), C l := WQ(t 1), c2 :=wi (t2 ), C3 := Fi (t 2 ); 
in Sjoquist ( 1973) C l :=gwt 1, c2 :=gct 2 , c3 := pt 2 and in 
Becker ( 1968), c l + c2 = Y., and c 3 :=f.. There is a problem in J J 
analyzing Becker's model since it is o nly part ially spec ifi ed and co n-
tains no ex plicit d ecision va riable. The implicit decision var ia b le 
seems to be the number of offenses, o., since Becker sta tes that his 
approach implies existence o f a fuilctionJrelating 0 j to the probability 
of conviction and the punishment a mong o ther things (see p. 177). 
Writing Oj (t2) transforms the mod31 into the t ime alloca tion frame-
work: The Bec ker model does not include lega l alternatives and 
hence mone tary equ ivalents wi ll be fu nctions of only t 2 , Sand W. 
Yet both Ehrlich and Sjoquist report that legal and illegal 
activities are substitutes in their models, which is clearly in-
consistent with model II in its present form.l8 The explana-
tion lies in one additional assumption that was adopted by 
these authors, viz. , that the time allocated to leisure is fixed 
and independent of the level of returns and costs in the mar· 
kets for legal and illegal activities. l n this case equations (11) 
above reduce to 
which will have an internal solution for G2 > L 1 and F~> 
c2 - I 1. Then 
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(30) at~ lao= - r: 18 (aEVIaWO) 1 J3 - r:8 (at~laW0) 
(30') at~ 1ao > o 
and the refore 
(31) at~lao < o 
Once the leisure market is fixed, legal 
and illegal activities become gross substi-
tutes. 
To summarize, if t 3 denotes the time 
allocated to leisure and e is any para meter 
which affects only the distribution of re -
turns and costs to illegal activity, then 
at~lae= -at~la8ift3 is free to va ry . 
(20) at~lap = ((V' (Ws)(- [ 1 + c2) - V' (Wu)(- L 1 + G2 - F 2))1J3 
Once the leisure margin is fixed a t~lae = 
at?lae, where E is any paramete r in the 
model. So these models are not time allo· 
(20') at~lap < o cation models in any usual sense of the 
(21) at~jaWO = - (pV" (Wu)(- L 1 + G2 - F 2) + (1 - p) V" (Ws)(- L 1 + G2))1J~ 
word. But the more important point is 
whether either model describes criminal 
behavior. And since each model provides 
(21 ') at~laWO > o 
(22) at~ ; aa =-G2cx (aEVIaWO) I J} + Gcx (at~ laW0 ) 
(22') at~lacx > o 
a number of unambiguous predictions, test-
ing should be relatively straigh tforward. 
One could begin by attempting to d is-
criminate between the fixed and variable 
leisure margin versions of the model. To 
0 II - - - I - 0 (23) at21a~ =p(V (Wu)F~(-L 1 +G2 -F2)+V (Wu)F2~)1J3 
test the fixed leisure margin assumption 
one could test whether a t 1 I ae + at2jae = 
0, where E represents each of the parame-
and as before 
"ff v" ;;;, o I <( 
where 1} is the Jacobian assoc ia ted wi th equation (1 9) 
evaluated at equilibrium.l9 Comparison of these expressions 
to equations (12') , (13'), (1 4') , (1 5') and (16") above indi-
cates that fixing the allocation to leisure leaves the predictive 
consequences of model II unchanged with respect to illegal 
behavior. Clearly, this will not be the case for the participa-
tion rate in legal endeavors. Since if E is an arbitrary para-
meter, then a tflae = -at~lae. Therefore 
(25) at? lap > o 
(26) at? laWO < o 
(27) at}lacx< O 
(28) at}la~> o 
(29) at?la r ~ o iff v" ~ o 
Finally note that 
18The Becker model deals only with the marke t for illegal activities. 
19 Again, the ~ Proofs of these propositions are virtua lly ident ical to 
those above. Inequality (24) requires F be separable as before. 
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ters en te ring the model. Assuming this 
assumption is rejected, one could then 
proceed to test the twelve restrictions 
given as ( 12), (J2")- ( 16), (16") and (17') and (18') above. 
As we noted previously, special interest lies in testing the 
independence restrictions, eq uations (12)- (16), and the 
gross complementarity of legal and illegal act ivity, since 
these p roperties of model II are associated with a smaller 
class of time allocation models than are the remaining prop-
erties. If both versions of the model are rejected, one has 
evidence that the preference restrictions, implicit in the 
specialized monetary equivalence functions, utilized in model 
IT are inappropriate. A more general model should be 
considered. 
Model III - The Allocation of Tin1e to 
Illegal Activity: The Case of Bernoulli Consequences 
In this section we present a model which fully accounts 
for non-monetary aspects of both the time allocation prob-
lem and the penalty. As the title of the section indicates, the 
model is concerned (as have been the other models in this 
paper) with the special case where the consequences of 
illegal activity are Bernoulli disttibuted. Using the notation 
developed above, Z (t1, t2, S, W) represents the agent's 
utility indicator with S being a vector of attributes of the 
penalty. For interpretive convenience we assume here that 
S is a scalar, the length of the sentence if convicted. It is 
natural to specify S = S0 + S] (t2, a), S1 (0, a)= 0 and S2 
> 0.20 The term S0 is a constan t and represents the minimal 
20Qf course it is possible that S 1 (0, Cf) > o, since people do occasional-
ly receive prison sentences for crimes, they do not commit. 
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prison sentence for the class of activities in question. Analo-
gous to above, we define Sa > 0 and s 2a > 0. The individ-
ual's problem is then to 
(9) max ( 1- p) Z (t1, t2, 0, Ws) + pZ (t1, t2 , S, Wu) 
1th 
subject to the condition t 1 + t2 + t3 = T; where Ws = L (t 1, 
o) + G (t2, a) and Wu = Ws - F (t2, ~)-Of course here the 
functions L, G and F contain only moneta1y aspects of the 
return to legal and illegal activity and moneta1y aspects of 
the penalty, respectively, since non-monetary aspects of 
the offense decision enter Z (·)directly. 
First order conditions for an internal max imum are 
(32) 
( )( s s u u u 1- p Z2 + ZwG2) + p (Z2 + ZsS2 + Zw (G2 - F2)) = 0 
wherezs=z(t1,t2, 0, Ws), Zu=z(t1,t2,S, Wu), Z~ =: 
azs;atl etc. 
It is of considerable interest to calculate the effects on the 
time allocation to criminal activity of changes in the various 
parameters .and to contrast these with the analogous calcu-
lations in models I and II. Straightforward computations 
reveal 
ln expressions (33) - (38), H = EZ and IJ~I is the Jacobian 
associated with (32) evaluated at equilibrium. As would be 
ex pected, it is not possible to estab lish the sign of any one of 
these comparative static de rivat ives unless one is willing to 
make much stronger assumptions about the preferences of 
offenders. 
The response of illegal activity to increases in illegal 
opportunities, a t2/aa, and legal opportunities, at2/ao' are 
composed of stochastic counterparts to neoclassical substitu-
tion and income effects. (See Block and Heineke ( 1973, 
1976b )). Even if one is willing to assume that illegal endea-
vors are inferior activities, it is no t possible to sign these 
terms, although as usual the direct substitution effect is 
signed. Tt is also interesting to note that the response of 
criminal activity to changes in sentence length, at2/aa, con-
tains two components-one measuring the response of t2 to 
changes in the level of the minimal sentence (caused by the 
shift in a), the other measuring the response of t2 to 
changes in the marginal severity, s 2 (caused by the shift 
in a), the other measuring the response of t2 to changes 
in the marginal severity, s 2 (caused by the shift in a). 
The latte r is analogous to a substitu tion effect and is always 
negative. 
The reader will recall that in both models l and II it was 
shown that if the penalty function was separable increases in 
the dispersion of returns to illegal endeavors led to decreases 
in such activity if and only if the agent was risk averse and 
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- HI ! G2a (aEZ/ aWO) + Ga (at2/aW0) 
I J4 I 
And finally the effect on the time spent in criminal activity 
due to changes in the severity of punishment (as measured 




vice versa ; i.e ., a t2Ja -r§ 0 iff U" ~ 0 in those models. It can 
be shown t hat in model III sign U" is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for determining the allocative effec ts of changes in 
the dispersion of returns. 
In other words, if the utility function is left unrestricted 
either explici tly or implicitly, via specialized assumptions 
about monetary equivalents, then no conclusions may be 
drawn concerning behavior toward risk by observing sign 
(at2/a 1'). This point of interest due to the fact that sign (at2/a 1'') is equivalent to determination of the rela tive 
responsiveness of offenses to changes in the probability of 
conviction and changes in the severity of punishment. (See 
the discussion following inequality (7') above.) Therefore 
Becker's contention that the "common generalization" that 
a change in the probability of conviction has a greater effect 
on the number of offenses than a change in punishment 
implies offenders are, on average, risk takers, is not forth-
coming in any time allocation model in which non-mone-
tary aspects the offense decision are left unrestricted. ln fact 
this "common generalization" is consistent with Uww ~ 0. 
Model VI- The Allocation of Time to Illegal Activity : 
Generalizations and Problems 
Each of the models investigated in this paper have the 
common attribute that there are but two consequences in 
the decision problem confronting the offender. At first blush 
thls seems to be an emminently reasonable characterization 
of the problem. But is it? If the decision problem is viewed 
as a general time allocation problem, then Bernoulli conse-
quences imply the individual will either succeed on every 
offense undertaken or fa il on every offense und ertaken-
a hopelessly unrealistic state of affairs. 
One solution for salvaging the time allocation model 
\vas given in Block and Heineke (1975a) and amounts to 
replacing the Bernoulli density with a more general density 
function. That is, let A be a continuous random variable 
defined on [0, 1] with distribution function K (A). 2 l 
The choice problem posed as model III then becomes 
(39) max { f I Z (t I , t2, S, W0 + L + G - A. F) dK (A)} 
tl ' t2 0 
subject to S = S0 + S 1 and t1 + t2 + t3 = t. In (39) it is possi· 
ble for the offender to "fail" on any portion of the total 
number of offenses committed. Although such a formulation 
does in corporate " partial success," a ubiquitous feature of 
the real world, several generalizations are badly needed. First, 
in model (39) only monetary aspects of the penalty are 
stochastic. It is clear that in any realistic model of criminal 
behavior, gains and penalties must be more generally stochas-
tic. But even in such a model, a second and more difficult 
problem remains if prison sentences are a possible penalty-
a problem not usually addressed in labor supply models: 
The individual may be apprehended and hence be unable to 
supply the planned number of offenses.22 This predicament 
arises not from an anomaly uniq ue to models of criminal 
choice, but instead is an in tr insic shortcoming of static 
models that could be remedied by modeling the decision 
problem as a dynamic process in which realized conse-
quences in period t are used to update the model and 
become the basis for decisions in period t + 1. 
Other than a dynamic programming model, a further 
means of circumventing the complications introduced when 
prison sentences are a possibility, is to view the individual's 
decision p roblem as either (i) that of choosing whether or 
not to commit any one offense or (ii) that of choosing the 
t ime allocation to any one offense. ln the first instance the 
decision variable is discrete, assuming the values zero and 
2 1 I fA can assu me but two values, say zero and one, a nd dK (A)/M = 
k (A), then k (1) = p, k (0) = 1-p a nd the funct io n k (·) reduces to 
the Bernoulli density. 
22This is not to say t hat involuntary exit from the labor market does 
not occur in markets fo r legal skills, e.g. , wh en the individual becomes 
too iiJ to wo~k, but instead that it is an insignif ica nt aspect of the 
total problem in these markets. 
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one, while in the lat ter, 0 ~ t2 ~ t as before. The distinction 
between these approaches is more than merely pedantic, 
since the qualitative implications of the two models differ 
substantially. If potential offenders view their decision prob-
lem as one of determining the amount of time to allocate to 
an offense on an offense by offense basis, then model nr, 
expression (9), is approp1iate and no qualitative implications 
are forthcoming without imposing strong restrictions on 
the preferences of offenders.23 On the other hand , if the 
decision problem is not viewed as a time allocation problem 
by the potential offender, but rather as a decision to either 
commit an offense or not on an offense by offense basis, 
then strong qualitative implications are forthcoming.24 ln 
any event, the discussion points up the fact that further 
progress in modeling criminal behavior requires more effort 
be allocated to understanding the structure of the under-
lying decision process and less to the generation of ad hoc 
models. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to provide some perspective 
on the problem of modeling the decision problem of a po· 
tential offender. The eight years which have passed since 
the appearance of Becker's path-breaking paper have seen 
several generalizations of Becker's framework. The papers of 
Ehrlich and Sjoquist have adopted Becker's notion of the 
monetary or wealth equiva lent of the psychic costs of an 
offense. As we saw, if such equivalences exist there is no 
formal objection to this procedure. But if the monetary 
equivalent funct ions are generally specified there seems to 
be no conceivable advantage to be gained by the procedure. 
Next we found that the models of Becker, Ehrlich and 
Sjoquist rested upon rather strong, implicit assumptions 
about the functional form of monetary equivalences and 
hence about the nature of the underlying utili ty function. 
In effect the assumptions used in these models transform the 
offense decision problem into a simple portfolio problem. 
It is this model which provides the theoretical underpin-
nings for the qualitatively unambiguous theories of deter· 
renee which have been reported in the literature. These 
results were reported above as model II and a special case of 
model 11 in which the time allocated to leisure is fixed. The 
latter is the model presented by Ehrlich and Sjoquist. 
Briefly, each of these models supports the traditional hypo-
theses concerning the deterrent effects of changes in the 
"gains" and "costs" of crime. Not so traditional results forth-
corning from models II include the norma lity of illegal activi-
ties in each model; the independence of legal labor ma rket 
23If this interpretation js adopted, it would be desirable to treat pas 
a function of t2 with p (t2) < 0. S ince for most individuals it seems 
li kely that the more time spent plan ning any given offense, the 
sma ller wi ll be t he like lihood of failure. 
24see Block ( 1976) for a n application of this model to the problem 
of choosing the location for a crim ina l act. In Heineke ( 1976) this 
model is contrasted with the time a llocation model from both 
theoretical and empirical points of view. 
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decisions from all parameter sh.i fts in illegal markets and the 
complementarity of legal and illegal activity, when t3 is free 
to vary; and if t3 is fixed, the prediction that chang_es in 
labor force participation rates, due to any parameter shift, 
wi ll be identical to changes in the amount of time allocated 
to illegal activity, but of opposite sign. 
ln the final section we discussed several problems which 
persist once psychic costs have been accorded their proper 
role. For one thing a time allocation model with Bernoulli 
distributed consequences implies the offender either succeeds 
or fa ils on every offense undertaken. More general distribu-
tions of consequences eliminate this difficulty. One funda-
mental problem remained : It may not be possible for the 
agent to carry out !lis plans if prison sen tences constitute 
punishments. Several approaches to solving this problem 
were suggested . 
REFERENCES 
I. Allingham, M. G. and Sandmo, A. " Income Tax 
Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Public 
Economics, November, 1972. 
2. Becker, G. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic 
Approach," Journal of Political Economy, March/ 
April, 1968. 
3. Block, M. K. "Modified Form of the Block/Lind Deter-
rence Formulation," Wo rking Paper, Hoover Institu-
tion, Stanford University, 1976. 
4. Block, M. K. and Heineke, J. M. "The Allocation of 
Effort Under Uncertainty : The Case of Risk Averse 
Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, March/ April, 
1973. 
5. and . "Multiattributed Preferences 
and Wealth Equivalents: The Case of Illegitimate Acti-
vity," Working Paper No. 16, Graduate School of 
Business, University of Santa Clara, 1974. 
6. and . "A labor Theoretic Analysis 
7. 
of the Criminal Choice," American Economic Review, 
June 1975. 
and . "Factor Allocations Under 
--=-Uncertainty: An Extension," Southern Economic 
Journal, 1975. 
8. and Lind, R. "An Economic Analysis of 
Crimes Punishable by Imprisonment," Journal of 
Legal Studies, June, 1975. 
9. Ehrlich, I. " Participation in Illegitimate Activities: 
A Theoretical Analysis," unpublished Ph.D. disserta· 
tion, University of Chicago, 1970. 
10. . "Participation in illegitimate Activities: 
A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," Journal 
of Political Economy, May/June 1973. 
60 
J I . Heineke, J. M. "A Note on Modeling the Criminal 
Choice Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, 
February, 1975. 
12. . " Models of CriminaJ Behavior with a 
Finite Number of Consequences," Working Paper, 
Hoover Institution, Stanford University, J 976. 
J 3. Kolm, S. Ch. "A Note on Optimum Tax Evasion," 
Journal of Public Economics, July, 1973. 
14. Singh, B. " Making Honesty the Best Po licy," Journal 
of Public Ec;onomics, July, 1973. 
J 5. Sjoquist, D. L. "Property <Zrime and Economic Be. 
havior: Some EmpiricaJ Results," American Economic 
Review, June, 1973. 
APPENDIX 
Model l-
By equation (3) 
(A- 1) 
ax0 JaW0 = - ((1 - p)(U"(Ws)gx + pU"(Wu)(gx- fx))!J1 
(R(Ws)(J-p)U'(Ws)gx +R(Wu)pU'(Wu) 
(gx - fx))/Jl o 
(R(Ws) A+ R (Wu) B) I 11° 
where R(Ws) = - U" (Ws)/U'(Ws), e tc. Now A > 0, 13 < 0 and 
A= - B by the first order condition for an internal maximum. 
Since decreasing absolute risk aversion implies R (Wu) > R 
(Ws) the numerator of (A-1) is negative and ax0 jaw o >O. 
lt follows immediately that ox0 /ocx > 0. Also, since (gx -
f x) < 0 by the first order conditions, risk aversion alone 
implies ax0 /o{3 < 0 . 
To show ax0 /op < 0 rewrite the first order condition as 
u' CWs) gx = p (U' (Ws) gx- u' (Wu) (gx- fx)) and com-
pare with the numerator of equation (6). 
Finally, from equation (7) we have 
Substituting for ax0 /3{3 and ax? /op and rearranging yie lds 
(A- 3) ox0 jp(gx-fx)U"(WJftrpf{3~ (!J(Ws)-U'(Wu))/f + 
a r ~ 
+ pU' (Wu) (fx{3f- flx) / f ~ /11° 
= pf{3 ~-fx)u''(Wu)-gx(!J (Ws)-V (WJ)/f)/Jlo 
iff (x, {3) = f 1 (x) f2 ({3). The numerator of this expression is 
negative iff U" > 0 and positive iff U" < O. Therefore if the 
penalty function is separable, ax0 /or ~ 0 iff u" ~ 0. 
Procedures precisely analogous to those used thus far , will 
verify the results reported in footnote 6, for the case when U" 
> 0 and - oR/oW > 0. 
